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518 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE-GENERAL ARTICLE VOID FOR VAGUENESS.? 
Much has been said or written about the rights of servicemen 
under the new Uniform Code of Military Justice,1 which is the 
source of American written military law. Some of the major 
criticisms of military law have been that it is too harsh, too vague, 
and too careless of the right to due process of law. A large por-
tion of this criticism has been leveled at Article 134,2 the general, 
catch-all article of the Code. Article 134 provides: 
3~ Alabama. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, 
l\Iaine, l\Iaryland, l\Iasschusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, and Vermont. South Carolina has the privilege by case 
decision. See note 4 supra. 
1 64 Stat. 107 <1950l, 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-736 (1952). The Code was 
enacted in l\lay, 1950, and went into effect May 31, 1951. It was a 
result of the criticism which descended upon military justice during World 
War II. See l\Iullally, Military Justice: The Uniform Code in Action, 53 
Col. L. Rev. 1 (1953). 
:i 64 Stat. 142, 143 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 728 (1952). 
NOTES 
Though not specifically mentioned in this code, all disorders and 
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed 
forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed 
forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons sub-
ject to this code may be guilty shall be taken cognizance of by a 
general or special or summary court-martial, according to the na-
ture and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of 
such court. 
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The purpose of this note is to explain the sources and func-
tions of Article 134, and to discuss some of its attendant problems. 
I. Standards In Cfoilian Criminal Laws 
The vagueness of this article raises a question of due pro-
cess of law. In order to understand the problem of the Constitu-
tionality of Article 134, it is necessary to point out generally ac-
cepted standards used in construing unclear civilian criminal laws. 
The famous Cohen Grocery3 case set the standard to be fol-
lowed in nonmilitary cases concerning the vagueness doctrine. A 
criminal statute cannot rest upon an uncertain foundation. To 
satisfy the Due Process clause, a criminal statute must clearly 
spell out to men of reasonable intelligence the acts which it makes 
criminal.4 A criminal statute which falls short of this standard 
is void for vagueness. 
Statutes creating crimes are to be strictly construed in favor 
of the accused; they may not be held to e>..'tend to those cases 
not covered by the words used ;5 the statute alone is the source of 
criminal conduct, and the public must look to the statute alone to 
discover what is proscribed. 6 No act, however wrongful, can be 
punished under a statute unless clearly within its terms.7 
Custom of a community or industry is of importance in inter-
preting vague statutes. If knowledge of an industry or com-
munity will give meaning to an otherwise vague statute, the stat-
ute will not fall ;8 if the custom does not dispel the vagueness, the 
3 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
4ld. at 89; cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Champlin 
Refining Co. v. Corp. Commission of Okla., 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Connally 
v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); National Association 
of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1952); United 
States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App. D.C. 592 (1910). 
5 United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (U.S. 1820). 
6 United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207 (1936). 
7 Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278 (1895); United States v. Brewer, 
139 U.S. 278 (1891). 
s Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918). 
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opposite conclusion will result.9 The custom must be well known 
and easily ascertainable. If definitions by subordinates empower-
ed to fill in details do not meet the above standards, not even the 
subordinates' interpretations will save the statute.10 
The expressed intent of the legislature should not be defeated 
by a strict, forced construction, but the intent of the legislatµre 
cannot save an unconstitutional statute.11 No more than a rea-
sonable degree of certainty is demanded, however, since the prac-
tical necessities of discharging the business of government limits 
the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.12 
Article 134 has been upheld by military courts, 13 in spite of 
the fact that the constitutional guaranties of due process are ap-
plicable to servicemen as well as civilians.14 In order to under-
stand this holding, and gauge its correctness, the history and re-
quirements of our military law must be considered. 
II. History Of Military Law 
A separate body of military law is not a new venture in 
American jurisprudence. As early as 1775, Congress adopted a 
series of i·ules and regulations for the government of the Army.15 
Patterned after the existing British Articles of War, the Articles 
underwent periodic revision,16 but the Uniform Code was the first 
major change in their structure since 1920,17 and was the first 
set of laws applicable to all our armed forces. 
Military law is a code of criminal law and procedure. It 
differs from federal criminal law, and from Anglo-American com-
mon law with respect to content and those whom it governs. But 
9 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commission of Okla., 286 U.S. 210 
(1932). 
10 Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946). 
11 United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385 (U.S. 1868); United States v. 
Morris, 14 Pet. 464 (U.S. 1840). 
12 Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952). 
13 United States v. Lee, 4 C.1\1.R. 185 (1951). 
H See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Burns v. Wilson. 346 U.S. 137 
<1953); cf. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United 'States 
ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944); Schita v. King, 133 
F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied sub nom., Schita v. Pescor, 322 
U.S. 761 (1944); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (l\LD. Pa. 1946); 
Schapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947). 
lu Winthrop. Military Law and Precedents 17 ( 2d ed. 1920). The first 
written military law in Europe was that of the Salic chiefs, drafted in 
the Fifth Century. 
io Id. at 22. 
liWalker, l\1ilitary Law 108 (1954). 
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its presence does not release military personnel from obedience to 
the higher law of the land. Military law merely imposes new 
obligations upon those who come within its purview.18 Our pres-
ent military law, like that in the past, consists of a written Code, 
regulations of the various services, and customs of the services. in 
Ill. Constitutional Source Of Military Lo:w 
Constitutional sanction for a separate system of military law 
is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution 
which grants Congress the power "to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces." Congress, 
under this grant, may set up a judicial system for the armed 
forces,20 and may make such rules as are necessary for the system 
to function; such rules, of course, are subject to the other pro-
visions of the Constitution. 
The major constitutional problem raised by the Code is 
whether or not servicemen retain their right to procedural due 
process of law, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sh.'th Amend-
ments. The Fifth and Sb...'th Amendments are applicable to serv-
icemen. Many recent cases,21 in habeas corpus proceedings, have 
closely scrutinized military justice, and have imposed on the courts-
martial the duty of zealously protecting rights of due process. 
The specific limitation in the Fifth Amendment of a serviceman's 
right to presentment and indictment by a grand jury has been 
narrowly construed. Since only this right of presentment and in-
dictment is forbidden, the interpretative tool of expressio 1miu.s 
leads to the conclusion that all other guaranties of the amendment 
are granted to those in the service.22 As early as 1907, it was 
lSSnedeker, l\Iilitary Justice Under the Uniform Code 446 (1953). 
19Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 15, at 17, 41. 
20 Snedeker, op. cit. supra note 18, at 44. 
21 See note 14 supra. Burns v. Wilson. 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the most 
recent Supreme Court pronouncement on this subject, established a "fair 
consideration" test. If the military court has fully and fairly dealt with 
the allegations of a denial of due process, the civil courts will not re-
view the constitutional question, but the civil courts will protect the rights 
of servicemen where it is apparent on the record that the military courts 
denied them due process. l\fost federal courts feel the case broadened 
the scope of habeas corpus review. See Suttles v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 
(9th Cir. 1954); Talbot v. United States ex rel. Toth, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. 
Cir. 1954); White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1954); Easley 
v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953). 
22 United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944); 
see dissent of Justice Douglas in Burns v. Wilson. 346 U.S. 137, 150 
(1953); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1948). 
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decided that servicemen could not be subjected to double jeopardy.23 
Certain leading cases have been said to hold that constitu-
tional rights of due process are not available to servicemen, but 
a careful study of their language, with consideration of their pecu-
liar fact situations, renders them readily distinguishable. Ex 
Parte Milligan,24 most frequently cited for the proposition that 
servicemen may be denied due process, involved a civilian who was 
tried by a military commission. The Court held the commission 
had no jurisdiction, and, in effect, struck a blow for due process. 
It is only in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Chase that 
language capable of being interpreted as denying due process can 
be found, and it seems clear that he was ref erring to the Fifth 
Amendment's specific requirement of the right to indictment by 
a grand jury. 
Ex Parte Quirin,2:; involved the rights of enemy aliens (Nazi 
saboteurs) who unlawfully entered the United States during war-
time. In a dictum, the Court said that only trial by jury and the 
right to indictment by grand jury were not available. 
In the well-known case of In Re Y amashita26 the Supreme 
Court reviewed the trial of a Japanese general by a military com-
mission. The Court held that civil courts would not review mili-
tary decisions, even if erroneous, if the military tribunal was prop-
erly constituted. The holding was attacked by two dissents, has 
been severely criticized, 27 and has been considerably weakened by 
more recent cases which have delved deeply into denial of due 
process in the course of habeas corpus proceedings.28 
The more recent cases which examine due process seem to 
be following a salutary trend, and tend to expunge the blot of 
23 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907). 
24 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866). 
25 317 u.s. 1 (1942). 
2G 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
2; Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (1949). 
2s In United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 ( 3d Cir. 1944), 
the court stated that a civil court in a habeas corpus proceeding may 
consider the circumstances of a courts-martial proceeding to determine 
whether it ran afoul of the basic standard of fairness embodied in due 
process of law; if the court finds that it violated due process, then it 
must discharge the prisoner. In Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (l\LD. 
Pa. 1946), the petitioner claimed that deprivation of due process resulted 
from a cursory pre-trial investigation of the facts, and that he was denied 
certain important witnesses at the trial. The court, in discharging the 
prisoner because of a denial of due process, pointed out the defects of the 
courts-martial as contrasted with the procedure in a civilian trial. 
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victor's justice, as set out in the Quirin ard Yamashita cases, 
from our jurisprudence. The fact that both Quirin and Yaniashita 
were war-time cases has further weakened them. 
IV. History Of The General Article 
The first historical use of a general article in any system of 
military law occurred in 1621.29 That article empowered the mili-
tary commander to punish acts not specifically proscribed by the 
other provisions of the law, if, in his opinion, such acts were 
wrongful offenses against discipline. Shortly thereafter, the 
British Army and Navy adopted similar articles,30 and the first 
American code in 1775 adopted the British versions. 
Until the adoption of the Uniform Code most of the charges 
preferred against enlisted men, and a great percentage of those 
preferred against officers were brought under the general arti-
cle.31 
General articles in the past have not specifically mentioned 
crimes within their scope, and Article 134 of the present Code is 
no exception. It sets out as crimes acts which are prejudicial to 
good order and discipline, which are disorders or neglects, and 
which constitute crimes not capital. 
V. Article 134 Dissected: Delegation To The President Examined 
A. CRIMES AND OFFENSES NOT CAPITAL 
"Crimes and offenses not capital" are rather difficult of as-
certainment. From the face of the article, crimes of any sovereign 
could be included in its purview. Crimes of Japan, Iran, and 
Afghanistan might be included in a literal interpretation, but such 
does not seem to be the practice. The Manual for Courts Martial 
explains these crimes as those United States federal crimes which 
do not demand the death penalty as punishment.32 The question 
arises under what authority the Manual makes such a definition. 
(1) Presidential Power from Congress 
The Manual was published under a Presidential Executive 
29 Snedeker, op. cit. supra note 18, at 898. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden 
included a general article in his Articles of War which were issued in 1621. 
30 Snedeker, op. cit. supra note 18, at 898, 899. The British Army 
adopted such an article in 1642, the Navy in 1649. The articles were so 
broad and vague that they were known to the Army as "the Devil's article." 
and to the Navy as "the Captain's cloak." 
31 Winthrop, op. clt. supra. note 15, at 720. 
321\Ianual for Courts Martial If 213(c) (1951). 
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Order to supplement and explain the Code. President Truman 
promulgated the Manual "By virtue of the authority vested in me 
by the Act of Congress entitled 'An act to unify, consolidate, re-
vise, and codify the Articles of War ... .' " 33 The Act does not 
specifically grant the President the right to issue such an explana-
tory Manual. 
Various sections of the Code grant the President the power, 
among others, to prescribe rules of procedure for courts-martial,34 
to commute sentences extending to death or involving a general 
or flag officer,35 and to convene general courts-marital,36 but ap-
parently no article in the present Code, or any statute unrepealed 
by the present Code, grants him the power to issue a Manual, or 
to define what constitutes a crime; nor could he be given such 
power, except as an adjunct to filling in details of a validly dele-
gated legislative standard.37 The closest the Code comes to grant-
ing such power is in Article 56, which gives the President power 
to set maximum limits for punishment of off ens es triable by 
courts martial. In establishing the table of maximum punish-
ments, the President set out forty-seven different offenses as 
falling within the scope of Article 134, all of which are offenses 
not falling under any other article of the Code.38 
(2) President's Power as Commander-In-Chief 
The issuance of the Manual might be explained as a valid 
exercise of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief, al-
though the Constitution specifically grants the power to make 
33 Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951). President Calvin 
Coolidge, when issuing a l\Ianual in 1928, stated, "By virtue of the powers 
in me vested as President of the United States, and pursuant to Chapter 
II of an Act ... ," thus referring to what some call the inherent powers 
of the President as Commander-in-Chief. 
34 64 Stat. 120 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 611 (1952). 
3~ 64 Stat. 131 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 658 (1952). 
:JG 64 Stat. 115 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 586 (1952). 
37 It may be that Congress intended Article 134 to be a standard to 
guide the President, and that Congress intended the President to delineate 
acts as violations of the statutory provision. If the l\Ianual is the Presi-
dent's attempt to fill in the details of the standard, the stigma of uncon-
stitutionality might still attach, for the l\Ianual's explanation of Article 
134 is nearly as fuzzy as the Article itself. Under the case of Kraus & 
Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946), a vague explanation of a 
standard by one empowered to explain the standard will fall, even though 
the one who made the explanation offers an interpretation of it. As to 
the President's power to make regulations concerning subjects which he 
has been given express delegation to control. see l\IcCall's Case, 15 Fed. 
Cas. 1225, No. 8,669 (E.D. Pa. 1863). 
3:>l\Ianual for Courts 1\Iartial U 127(c) (1951). 
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rules and regulations for the armed forces to Congress.3n It may 
be questioned whether the power as Commander-in-Chief gives 
the President the right to determine what constitutes crimes in 
the armed forces.40 
The President, as Commander-in-Chief, possesses power which 
is difficult of definition or identification. There is little case law 
as to his power to make regulations in the field of military justice 
when Congress has not granted him specific power to make such 
regulations. The one recent decision most nearly in point held 
that the President could not authorize a subordinate to e:ll..i;end 
the jurisdiction of a courts-martial.41 Other cases42 concerning the 
President's power as Commander-in-Chief are not too helpful, since 
the President's power in those cases does not conflict with the 
constitutional power of Congress to make rules and regulations 
for the government of the armed forces. 
"When the President is acting within his own executive realm, 
it appears that his executive power will be upheld.43 But military 
justice is placed by the Constitution in Congress so it would seem 
that it cannot be contended that the power falls within the Presi-
dent's emergency or war-time power as Commander-in-Chief.44 
Since military justice is in the legislative area, any power 
which the President has to make regulations must come from 
Congress. And Congress does not seem to have specifically grant-
ed the President the power either to issue a Manual, or to deter-
mine new crimes. Even assuming that the Manual is merely the 
39 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. 
40 Congress has granted the President vast powers in the time of war, 
l\Iartin v. l\Iott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U.S. 1827), and in the field of international 
relations, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936), but the power to determine crimes is a legislative act, and a 
delegation of such power to an administrative agency has been disallowed, 
People v. Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934), 
aff'd per curiam, 267 N.Y. 508, 196 N.E. 553 (1935); cf. Davis, Adminis-
trative Law 66 (1951). The recent trend of decisions has been aimed at 
the abolition of the non-delegation doctrine, as it is wholly judge-made. 
Davis, op. cit. supra, at 43. 
41Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949). 
42Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); United States v. 
Montgomery Ward, 150 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1945); Weightman v. United 
States, 142 F.2d 188 (1st. Cir. 1944). 
43 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
44 See general discussion of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief 
by Cohen and Cohen, The Divine Right of Presidents, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 416 
(1950). The area of the President's power is indeterminate, and often the 
decisions rest on the policy arguments advanced in favor of granting or 
denying power. 
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outgrowth of the President's power to prescribe rules of proce-
dure,4::; and maximum punishments,46 and assuming further that 
the President may make regulations not incidental to these sub-
j ects,47 there is much in the Manual that could hardly be explained 
under this theory.48 Also, the President, in issuing the Manual, 
made reference only to the Code as a source of his power to so 
act, and did not refer to his power as Commander-in-Chief. 
Assuming arguendo, however, that the President had the 
power to set out specific crimes as an adjunct to his power to 
determine maximum punishments, could other crimes charged 
under the Article but not listed in the table of maximum punish-
ments meet the void for vagueness test? Although the forty-seven 
crimes might be within the scope of the Article, all other crimes 
not mentioned in the Code or the table would be unknown to those 
who sought to discover them. And it is no answer to argue that 
the "unknown Laws" are actually known because they are customs 
of the service. So much of the custom of the service is unwritten 
and impossible to ascertain. 
B. THE CRIME OF " ... ALL DISORDERS AND NEGLECTS TO 
THE PREJUDICE OF GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE 
ARMED FORCES, [AND] ALL CONDUCT OF A NATURE TO 
BRING DISCREDIT UPON THE ARMED FORCES ... .'' 
Turning from "crimes and offenses not capital,'' it is readily 
seen that the other two provisions of Article 134 are boundless. 
They have been broadly construed to include acts not sufficiently 
well-known to be custom.49 As a result of these "unknown" crimes, 
a person subject to the Code is in the position of deciding at his 
peril whether his prospective conduct is punishable.50 
The Court of Military Appeals51 has held that the general 
4u 64 Stat. 120 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 611 (1952). 
4G 64 Stat. 126 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 637 (1952). 
47 See note 3 7 supra . 
.is For examples, see Manual For Courts 1\Iartial c. 5, c. 23, c. 26 (1951). 
All the definitions of the punitive Articles would seem to fall outside the 
President's power. 
49 Snedeker, op. cit. supra note 18, at 448. 
:.;o But cf. Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
See the table of maximum punishments, set out in paragraph 127 (c) of 
the l\Ianual for Courts Martial. Such acts as communicating insulting 
language to a female and abusing a public animal are listed. It is sub-
mitted that a decision as to what constitutes a violation of acts such as 
these rests solely on the moral values of the convening authority who in-
stitutes the action. 
ul 64 Stat. 129, 130 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 654 (1952). The Court of 
Military Appeals is the highest court in the military judicial system, and 
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article is not intended to set up a moral standard for the conduct 
of an individual's private affairs.;;2 To be the subject of proscrip-
tion under the Article, acts, as a general rule, must touch or in-
volve other persons.53 In regard to those acts to the prejudice of 
good order and discipline referred to in Article 134, the Manual 
states: 
To the prejudice of good order and discipline refers only to acts 
directly prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to acts 
which are prejudicial only in a remote or indirect sense. An ir-
regular or improper act can scarcely be conceived which may not 
be regarded as in some indirect or remote sense prejudicing dis-
cipline, but the article does not contemplate such distant effects, 
and is confined to cases in which the prejudice is reasonably di-
rect and palpable.54 
This definition can be analogized to the broad and vague 
regulation of an administrator who has been given power to fill 
in details of a legislative policy. Under prevailing case law, such 
an indefinite regulation by a civilian administrator would be in 
grave danger of being stricken as void for vagueness, and further 
clarification by the issuing agency or administrator would be of 
no avail.55 Since civil standards of due process are granted serv-
icemen, it would seem that the explanatory material in the Manual 
is also void for being too vague. 
VI. Custorns Of The Service And The General Article 
Customs of the service have always been used to explain and 
determine violations of former versions of the general article/ii; 
just as they have been applied to Article 134.57 Violation of such 
custom is a violation of the Article. This is true even though 
Article 134, like its predecessors, makes no mention of custom 
being controlling. 
A. WHAT IS "MILITARY CUSTOM"? 
Military custom must be of long standing, certain, uniform, 
is a product of the new Code. It consists of three judges, appointed by 
the President for 15 years. The court has the power to prescribe its own 
procedure. The court reviews all cases forwarded to it by the Judge Ad-
vocate General of the various services, and those other general courts-
marital cases which it desires to hear. 
52 United States Y. Snyder, 4 C.l\I.R. 15 (1952). 
53 Ibid. 
Ml\Ianual for Courts Martial 1I 213(a) (1951). 
55 Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946). 
56 Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 15, at 41. 
57 United States v. Snyder, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952). 
528 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
compulsory, consistent, general, well-known, and not in opposition 
to the Constitution, United States statutes, or military regula-
tions. 08 Once such a custom has been established, it has the force 
of law, and controls in the absence of statute.59 Usage, however, 
has no weight. Usage is the preliminary formation of custom, 
and consists merely of the repetition of the act. 60 
B. IDSTORICAL USE OF CUSTOM TO INTERPRET THE 
GENERAL ARTICLE 
The general article in the first American Na val code read: 
"All other faults, disorders, and misdemeanors which shall be 
committed on board any ship belonging to the Thirteen United 
Colonies, and which are not herein mentioned, shall be punished 
according to the laws and customs in such cases used at sea."61 
The first Army general article read: "All crimes not capital, 
and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be 
guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, 
although not mentioned in the Articles of War, are to be taken 
cognizance of by a general or regimental court-marital, according 
to the nature and degree of the offense, and be punished at their 
discretion."62 
The Na val article contained a direct reference to custom until 
1862. The Army articles have never contained such a reference. 
The leading case on the use of custom as an aid in interpreting 
the general article is Dynes v. Hoover.63 This case interpreted 
the naval article at a time when custom was mentioned therein, 
and allowed its use to clarify the statute. In S1nith v. Whitney,64 
the Court dismissed the fact that the language of the Naval article 
no longer included a reference to custom, and held that custom 
and usage were capable of pointing out a violation of the general 
article. This holding was a result of a tenacious adherence to 
the doctrine of stare decisis. 
It could be argued that Congress intended to do away with 
the use of custom by removing any language mentioning it from 
;Js Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 15, at 42, 43, citing United States v. 
Buchanan, 8 How. 82 (U.S. 1850); Thompson v. Riggs. 5 Wall. 680 (U.S. 
1867). See also Walker, op. cit. supra note 17, at 56. 
r,9 Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 15, at 42, 43. 
c.o Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 15, at 42, 43. 
61 Art. 38, Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies 
(1775). 
1;2 Art. L, Articles of War of 1775, collected in Winthrop, op. cit. supra 
note 15, at 957. 
1:3 20 How. 65 (U.S. 1858). 
•H 116 U.S. 167 (1886). 
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the article.6~ However, the acquiesence of Congress in later years, 
as recently demonstrated in the enactment of the Code, may throw 
doubt upon this argument. 
Nonetheless, the use of custom still prevails in military law. 
Its existence can only be explained by arguing that it has become 
a part of the military common law. 
C. CUSTOl\I AS A DEVICE TO AVOID THE VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS DOCTRINE 
If all custom were written, it seems clear that it could be 
used to clarify the general Article and thus avoid constitutional 
attack under the void for vagueness doctrine. But custom is al-
most wholly unwritten.66 How many new recruits, or how many 
seasoned veterans know the complicated customs of the army~ It 
is not enough to argue that every person is presumed to know the 
law. In civilian law a person, or his attorney, has the opportunity 
to examine the written laws and opinions. But where there are 
no written customs a person can only speculate whether his plan-
ned conduct will be violation of unwritten custom and thus a viola-
tion of Article 134. 
However, Article 13767 of the Code provides that the general 
article, among others, shall be read and explained to all enlisted 
men within six days after their entrance upon active duty, and 
again after they have completed six months of active duty. Yet 
in actual practice, the perfunctory explanation which is performed 
does not come close to setting out all the customs of the service,'3':1 
and it would be well-nigh impossible for the most careful explana-
tion to set out all the myriad of customs. 
It would seem that unwritten custom could not be used to 
avoid a constitutional attack against Article 134 under the void 
'for vagueness doctrine. 
VII. Inconsistency Of Recent Decisions Regarding A1·ticle 134 
A recent case in the Court of Military Appeals, United States 
65 Legislative history is silent as to the reason for the change in the 
wording. See discussion on S. 348, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2866 
(1862). 
66 Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 15, at 42. 
67 64 Stat. 144 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 733 (1952). 
68 Statements obtained in discussions and interviews with selected of-
ficers of the United States Army and Air Force, who did not wish to 
divulge their identity. The same sources stated that few servicemen rea-
lized they were entitled to a copy of the explanatory Manual by so asking. 
Indeed, not all servicemen are even aware of the existence of the Manual. 
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'V. Clay,60 categorically stated that the court would require courts-
martial to give servicemen rights and privileges parallel to those 
granted to civilians in civil courts. The court also turned to deci-
sions of federal courts in civilian cases as exemplifying the re-
quirements of due process. 
This holding seems inconsistent with the decision of the Court 
of Military Appeals in United States v. Frantz.70 The court ad-
mitted the patent ambiguity of Article 134, but decided that the 
long usage of general articles in the service, coupled with the dis-
ciplinary needs of the service, justified the clean bill of health 
which the court gave the Article. 
Comparison of the two cases illustrates that in the Clay case, 
the court was following the recent and well-reasoned trend of civi-
lian courts in according the rights of due process to servicemen.71 
The court inf erred that the safeguards of civilian procedure were 
more capable than military standards of providing to servicemen 
the rights to which they were entitled. In the Frantz case, the 
court seemed fettered by tradition, and manifested an unwilling-
ness to depart from the constriction of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Conclusion 
Anyone attempting to evaluate the present system of military 
justice must decide whether it is more desirable to have the sys-
tem be an instrument for meting out punishment and maintaining 
discipline at any cost, or whether it is better to have strong, ef-
fective and impartial courts within the fighting forces. 
Since the constitutional guaranty of due process is applicable 
to servicemen, the outmoded argument that the overriding mili-
tary function necessitates a judicial system which dispenses dis-
cipline and not justice should be disregarded. Military and civil-
ian courts alike should strive to grant to servicemen the rights to 
which they are entitled. 
Article 134 should be amended to conform to civilian stand-
ards in criminal statutes, and to set out clearly and specifically 
the acts which fall within its scope. And although the use of 
custom is deeply embedded in military law, perhaps its use should 
be re-examined, in spite of the fact that it is a peg on which the 
military can hang its disciplinary measures. 
69 1 C.l\I.R. 7 4 (1951). 
iO 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953). 
71 See note 15 supra. 
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